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Abstract:  Precious little has been written in academic scholarship 
about the US arms relationship with Iran. Much of the scholarly focus 
has been drained into an orbital vortex caused by twin crises in Iranian 
history: the 1953 British and American sponsored coup and the preced-
ing oil blockade, and the 1979 Islamic revolution that swept the Shah 
from power. Hence, the years in-between 1953 and 1979 are often treated 
only in passing. A major feature of this period was an ever escalating 
arms relationship between Iran and the US which progressively grew 
both qualitatively and quantitatively throughout the Cold War from 
a  relatively minor aid relationship into a major arms credit partner-
ship; within which Iran became the US’s largest arms export customer 
by 1971. This article focuses on the very early years of the relationship be-
tween 1950 and 1963 within which successive US Presidents viewed Iran 
as a relatively weak chess piece in a sensitive region, with military aid 
being one of the major levers with which to secure the stabilisation and 
pro-American disposition of Iran in the emerging Cold War context.
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Introduction
Precious little has been written in academic scholarship about the 
US arms relationship with Iran. Much of the scholarly focus has 
been drained into an orbital vortex caused by twin crises in Irani-
an history: the 1953 British and American sponsored coup and the 
preceding oil blockade, and the 1979 Islamic revolution that swept 
the Shah from power. Hence, the years in-between 1953 and 1979 
are often treated only in passing in the literature. A major feature 
of this period was an ever escalating arms relationship between 
Iran and the US which progressively grew both qualitatively and 
quantitatively throughout the Cold War from a  relatively minor 
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aid relationship into a major arms credit partnership; within which 
Iran became the US’s largest arms export customer by 1971. This 
article focuses on the very early years of the relationship between 
1950 and 1963 within which successive US Presidents viewed Iran 
as a relatively weak chess piece in a sensitive region, with military 
aid being one of the major levers with which to secure the stabili-
sation and pro-American disposition of Iran in the emerging Cold 
War context. 
Following the end of the Second World War, Iran was the scene 
of the fi rst confrontation in what would become known as the Cold 
War between the US and the Soviet Union (USSR). In early 1946, 
the USSR refused to withdraw from northern Iran where its troops 
had been deployed since 1941 to keep what was a vital allied war-
time supply line clear from Axis interference. This series of events, 
although resolved without major confl ict, established at a very early 
juncture the potential importance of Iran within the emerging Cold 
War structure as a nation placed on a geostrategic hotspot, between 
the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf region. The Gulf contained 
the world’s largest pool of oil, the steady supply of which was vital 
to keep the Japanese and Western European economies fuelled. In 
October 1946, after the resolution of the Soviet-Iran crisis, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff  (JCS) concluded the fi rst major US strategic appraisal 
of Iran. The report confi rmed that both oil resources and strate-
gic location, which provided ‘a base for both defensive and coun-
teroff ensive operations against the Soviet Union, gave Iran major 
s trategic importance.’1 Hence, an emerging American approach of 
shoring up Iran and stabilising it through military and economic 
aid began to fall into place, to allow the (as then) weak and under-
developed nation to withstand any further adventurism from its 
northern neighbour. 
Crisis  in Iran
While Europe absorbed the bulk of early Cold War US attention via 
the on-going division of Germany and the emergence of the fabled 
Iron Curtain, the young “Shah” of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, 
was keen to ensure the Truman administration did not forget about 
Iran. As the Iranian Constitution stood in 1949 the Shah only held 
power thinly via executive control over the Iranian military. Thus 
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the Shah, who had an autocratic disposition, understandably cov-
eted a strong military to buttress his throne, a  theme that would 
come to characterise his long reign which endured until 1979. 
With the strategic importance of Iran clearly established by events 
in 1946, the Shah sought an arms partnership with America that 
would enable him to secure his domestic position, and simultane-
ously enable the US to shore up a Cold War weak-spot in a sensitive 
region. In short, a win-win scenario for both nations.
The Shah undertook a  long visit to the US through November 
and December 1949 and used much of his time to petition for mil-
itary assistance to enable Iran to bulk up its rudimentary armed 
forces. The Shah had narrowly survived an assassination attempt 
in February 1949, which earned him sympathy in Washington and 
contributed to a State Department report prior to his 1949 visit that 
expressed the emerging importance of the Shah in the broader con-
tainment eff ort, primarily via his role in containing the spread of 
communism in his own country via the Tudeh party who had been 
blamed for the assassination attempt and subsequently banned. 
However there were lingering doubts in the Truman administra-
tion over the Shah’s ability to maintain his position, and in his abil-
ity as a leader,2 and hence doubts over to what extent the US should 
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entrench itself to him. Consequently the Shah left the US with an 
assurance that aid would be forthcoming, yet reservations remained 
over the exact nature that aid would take due to Iran’s instability. 
Military aid to Iran eventually began on a very limited scale in 
1950, as part of a seven-year programme of $124 million, the bulk 
of which was delivered between 1950 and 1954.3 The consistent 
American position established by Truman in 1950 and subsequent-
ly maintained by Eisenhower, was that the aid programme was in-
tended only to build Iran’s forces up to the level where they could 
be effective to facilitate the internal security and viability of Iran, 
and of the Shah’s pro-American regime. Yet, the Shah consistently 
read his regional position differently, desiring a military that could 
enable him to provide for his own defence, raise Iran’s international 
profile, and gradually rise to a position of prominence in the region 
– fulfilling (as he saw it) Iran’s rightful place in history as the heir 
to the Persian Empire. Hence, from the outset the perceptions in 
Washington and the perceptions of the Shah over military aid were 
deeply mismatched.
On 10 January 1953, ten days prior to assuming office, Dwight 
D. Eisenhower noted in his diary that he and his Secretary of State, 
John Foster Dulles had set out four key priorities for Middle East-
ern policy noted in order of importance: First was a new system of 
wide spectrum asymmetric containment – replacing the dominant 
prevailing wisdom of the Truman administration based on NSC-68; 
second was resolving the crisis surrounding the Iranian oil blockade 
which had resulted from Iranian nationalisation of what had been 
a British oil concession; third was dealing with British disputes with 
Egypt over basing rights in the Suez Canal; and fourth was a solu-
tion to the Arab-Israeli dispute.4 In line with the aforementioned, 
Eisenhower set into motion a New Look study into containment 
options via Project Solarium, and attention swiftly turned to Iran. 
The Shah had become increasingly sidelined by a powerful gov-
erning coalition, the National Front, which rallied for a revised oil 
concession, and eventually mandated nationalisation of the AIOC 
in March 1951, unilaterally snatching Britain’s largest overseas com-
mercial asset. The British responded with a blockade and economic 
sanctions, which gradually ground Iranian oil exports to a  halt.5 
What was to the British an economic dispute eventually became 
a Cold War issue to the Americans, complete with undertones of 
US Arms 
Policy to Iran, 
1950–1963
19
fears of both disruption to the oil supply to is western allies, and of 
domestic nationalism in Iran turning leftward to provide a fertile 
ground for a communist takeover via the now underground Tudeh 
party.
After a period of considering supporting the nationalist Iranian 
Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossadeq, and seeking a non-violent 
solution between 1951 and 1953, American attention steadily turned 
toward removing him. Falling into line with sustained British per-
suasion from Churchill, Eisenhower and Dulles became gradually 
convinced that Mossadeq would neither strike a deal to resolve the 
on-going oil dispute, nor could be trusted to contain communism. 
As a consequence, CIA field agent Kermit Roosevelt was directed 
to initiate a coup in August 1953 in tandem with the British Secret 
Intelligence Service to oust Mossadeq. This move delighted the 
British who had been frustrated with Truman who previously de-
murred at the prospect of direct intervention.6 As events played out, 
America emerged as the dominant external power in Iran essential-
ly inheriting the neo-imperial role of the British who throughout 
the affair appeared growingly powerless. 
The shutdown of oil exports via the British blockade left Iran 
practically bankrupt by 1953, yet afterward it emerged as an embry-
onic client state of America, complete with a reinvigorated mon-
arch who owed restoration of his throne and a  newly enhanced 
domestic power base to the American intervention. Vice President 
Richard Nixon visited Tehran in December 1953 and was impressed 
during his visit, noting that he sensed an inner strength and strong 
leadership potential in the young monarch.7 Nixon’s positive im-
pressions ensured that an initial package of $45 million in American 
grant aid that had been directed to Iran immediately following the 
coup would be followed up with future assistance.8 
With the crisis in Iran seemingly resolved, regional politics con-
verged upon resurrecting an idea of a  collective regional security 
system that had been originally proffered by the British earlier in 
the decade, but had fallen to the wayside due to Egypt’s emerging 
Arab Nationalist persuasion, which scuppered the original plan 
which was based around a primary Egyptian role. On 2 April 1954 
Turkey and Pakistan signed a bilateral mutual security treaty, which 
rekindled American hopes for a Western oriented defence grouping 
in the region. By July 1954, Eisenhower had approved NSC-5428, 
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which was influenced heavily by Dulles, and recommended that 
that a  best regional defence strategy would be via a northern tier 
of US-aligned states to contain any Soviet expansion southwards, 
based on an expansion of the Turkey-Pakistan pact.9 The Baghdad 
Pact followed in 1955, modelled loosely after NATO as a mutual co-
operation, protection and non-intervention pact and comprised of 
Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and, interestingly, Britain.
The emergence of the Pact was seised upon by the Shah as a way 
in which he could rebuild Iran’s reputation after the crisis of 1953. 
The Shah’s indications of involvement accelerated the timetable for 
a  revision of American military aid planning to Iran through the 
summer of 1955. John Foster Dulles approached the Department of 
Defence on 27 June, requesting that Iran be awarded a package of 
$50 million in additional military aid for 1956 and 1957 to prepare it 
for its role in the emerging Pact.10 The Secretary of Defence, Charles 
Wilson responded to Dulles on 5 August denying the request for 
two reasons. Firstly a review of the viability of long term American 
training and support for Iran’s army (a programme set in motion 
in January 1955) was still incomplete. Secondly, the Shah had yet to 
demonstrate, beyond rhetoric, exactly what role he envisioned Iran 
playing in future regional collective defence, making any American 
commitment premature.11 
Although discussion occasionally broached the issue,12 Iran’s mil-
itary aid was not revised until discussions began over a programme 
to replace the final tranche of pre-existing military aid, which was 
scheduled to end, on target in 1957. Developing bespoke policy for 
Iran was heavily overshadowed within American regional policy by 
the development of Eisenhower doctrine, which did not, much to 
the chagrin of the Shah, advocate a military upgrade of Iran. In fact, 
the doctrine advocated the exact opposite, committing American 
forces to regional security. The administration simply did not be-
lieve that a direct attack on Iran was likely. Instead, as with the Tru-
man administration, attention centred on the political weakness of 
the Shah and the deterioration of the Iranian economy due to infla-
tion, which was in fact partly caused by the Shah’s various existing, 
yet comparatively primitive military endeavours.
In a discussion between Dulles and the Iranian Foreign Minis-
ter on 17 September 1957, Dulles noted that all of America’s free 
world allies were competing for military aid, the budget for which 
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was steadily shrinking as Congress progressively exercised an in-
creased fiscal displeasure with military assistance spending. One 
month later, William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary for Near 
Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs wrote to Dulles after the 
Shah had delivered a list of military requirements to the Pentagon, 
costed between $300 and $500 million confirming that the Shah 
‘expects far more military aid from us that we can give him.’13 The 
Shah continued to press hard for the military assistance he deemed 
essential, which began to grate upon the American Ambassador to 
Iran, Selden Chapin, who noted on 9 November that US-Iran rela-
tions had developed into an ‘unfavorable trend,’14 and suggested one 
month later that the Shah’s interest in his military was ‘emotional 
rather than logical.’15 Ambassadorial relations with the Shah became 
particularly strained through 1957 due to his military demands, 
which the Embassy frequently reported back to Washington as “ex-
treme.”16 
First Significant Arms Developments:  1958–1959
Dulles met with Eisenhower to discuss the Shah’s lingering secu-
rity situation on 22 January 1958, securing Eisenhower’s permission 
to break the impasse and offer Iran more tanks and ‘a more mod-
ern air squadron.’17 Dulles then departed for Tehran for a two-day 
visit between 24 and 26 January to personally assess the Iranian se-
curity situation before making any formal offer. One day into his 
trip Dulles cabled Eisenhower noting that his visit had so far been 
“explosive,” as the Shah ‘who considers himself a military genius’ 
remained obsessed with his military situation, whilst his govern-
mental ministers were deeply concerned with economic problems, 
with which they were “unable to cope with” due to the Shah’s all 
encompassing military obsessions.18 Despite the reservations of the 
Iranian ministers, Dulles pressed ahead on the second day of his 
visit with the arms offer that had been sanctioned in his prior meet-
ing with Eisenhower,19 and the following day added that a further 
development loan in the magnitude of $40 million would be made 
to address Iran’s economic concerns.20 The deal was a development 
for the Shah, yet it was several orders of magnitude below what he 
had asked for in the autumn of 1957. 
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The Shah, proving to be a reliably hard man to please, noted only 
days after Dulles’ departure from Tehran that American assistance 
was at such a low level as to be taking Iran for granted, comparing 
Iran unfavourably to neighbours such as India who continued to re-
ceive American aid despite courting the Soviets.21 As news reached 
Washington in mid-April that the Shah would embark on a tour of 
Taiwan and Japan in June, the Departments of State and Defense 
swiftly collaborated on a  communiqué to American military and 
diplomatic officials that they should ‘take all possible discreet ac-
tion to prevent a glamorous display of US military aid’ in both na-
tions, fearing that it would enrage the Shah and lead to further ‘ex-
orbitant demands.’22
Following his East Asian trip, the Shah visited Washington on 
30 June for a three-day visit, which included two meetings with Ei-
senhower. Dulles briefed Eisenhower to expect that the Shah would 
use the visit to press hard for a revision of Iran’s military aid, and 
recalled that the Shah had been wholly unreceptive to prior assur-
ances that Iran did not need a military of significance to deter the 
Soviets, as ‘the deterrent strength of the United States constituted 
the primary obstacle to Soviet aggression in the area.’23 As expected, 
the Shah used his time to express his case of a region at risk from 
both Arab nationalist and communist threats, to which Eisenhow-
er subsequently remarked to Dulles was “fairly convincing.”24 Al-
though nothing new was agreed as a result of the visit in the area of 
military aid, subsequent events only two weeks later seemed to vali-
date the Shah’s case as the Iraqi coup in mid-July sent shockwaves 
across the region, caused the Eisenhower doctrine to be invoked in 
Lebanon, and indicated strongly that the idea of collective security 
through the Baghdad pact was deeply flawed. 
The events of the summer of 1958 led to the Eisenhower ad-
ministration warming towards the remaining friends they had in 
the region, of which the Shah had proved to be one of the most 
staunch. In what was the most significant development in Iran’s 
military progress to date, Eisenhower noted to Dulles on 16 July 
that the new regional situation dictated that Iran should have all 
the military assistance that it could absorb.25 Three days later Eisen-
hower passed that sentiment on to the Shah, 
We believe it is important to begin now to reconsider our 
collective security planning. It is also our belief that your 
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armed forces as now supported should be brought up to 
agreed operational strength and to a high level of opera-
tion efficiency.
More importantly, he added that
We fully recognise that the strengthening of Iran’s mili-
tary power and its efforts to achieve economic develop-
ment will result in strains on the Iranian economy. You 
may depend on the sympathetic and prompt considera-
tion by the United States, within our available means, of 
Iran’s needs for economic assistance as they develop.26
Eisenhower’s words translated into Plan Counterbalance which 
included training and equipment for an additional 37,000 service-
men, more squadrons of tanks, air defence equipment, and F-86 
Fighters as part of a renewed five year commitment to Iran. In what 
would later become characteristic behaviour by the Shah, he re-
flected upon receiving the news of the plan that whilst he accepted 
the package, he would have preferred the more advanced F-100 and 
that the anti-aircraft defence system was inadequate.27 The summer 
of 1958 was the first time that regional developments significantly 
affected American arms policy towards Iran since military assist-
ance had begun in 1950. It would not be the last. 
Through the remainder of 1958, and into 1959, the Shah contin-
ued to press for yet more military assistance, taking Eisenhower’s 
July letter “very liberally” from the outset, which had caused unusu-
al intensity in his requests and raised alarm throughout Washing-
ton.28 As the Shah felt his additional requests were being ignored or 
procrastinated over, he began to harness a brinkmanship strategy 
aimed at blackmailing America to fulfil his military wishes.29 The 
strategy featured thinly veiled threats that should his requests not be 
met he would ‘reconsider Iran’s position vis-à-vis USSR,’ sentiments 
that led the State Department to be “increasingly disturbed”as fre-
quent reports of the aforementioned were delivered in Ambassado-
rial correspondence from Tehran.30 Eisenhower delivered a veiled 
threat of his own to the Shah on 30 January noting that his mili-
tary requests had diverged significantly from those with which 
Washington had set out in Plan Counterbalance, and whilst it was 
not unexpected that differences should arise between “the best of 
friends,” he did not expect the Shah to ‘take a step which would im-
peril’ Iran’s security.31 Relations remained strained throughout 1959, 
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to the point where it was deemed wise that Eisenhower add Iran 
to what was dubbed a “good will trip” to various allied nations in 
the Middle East, North Africa, the Indian Subcontinent and South 
East Europe. Eisenhower subsequently landed in Tehran on 14 De-
cember for a brief visit, lasting less than six hours. Eisenhower in-
dulged the Shah to present a briefing of what he felt Iran needed for 
its defence, yet concluded the meeting without making any firm 
commitment.32 Characteristically, the Shah interpreted the meeting 
as a  presidential “endorsement” of his defence plans, causing yet 
more frustration in Washington as the Shah proceeded thereafter 
to make further military enquiries to the Pentagon.33 
Eisenhower wrote to the Shah in early January to clear up the 
misunderstanding. The letter underwent several careful rewrites 
at Eisenhower’s insistence to ensure that the language was impos-
sible to misinterpret, and communicated a clear message that the 
administration was reviewing the regional security of Iran, yet that 
review was proceeding on a timetable that would not be dictated 
by the Shah.34 Despite the tactful wording, the letter had no effect 
on the Shah, who one week later forwarded Eisenhower a  list of 
military requirements valued at approximately $600 million.35 It is 
worth pausing momentarily to highlight the vast divergence in the 
Shah’s requests and the existing assistance programme. Military aid 
following the summer 1958 period had been planned in the modest 
tens of millions per annum; the Shah was asking for nothing less 
than a revolution in scale. 
The administration eventually began to formulate a  response 
to the Shah’s requests via a NSC policy paper on Iran delivered on 
6 July 1960, which roundly rejected any revolutionary change main-
taining that the level of aid established in mid 1958 was adequate.36 
By 19 September the full review of military assistance for Iran had 
been completed, as had a  forecast of forthcoming expected Con-
gressional budgetary limits. With the aforementioned in mind, the 
Secretary of State Christian Herter, with concurrence from the 
Pentagon, wrote to Eisenhower noting that ‘it will not be possi-
ble for us to provide the Shah with military aid in an amount even 
approaching his requests.’37 Hence, military aid for 1961 would be 
approximately $22 million, broadly concurrently with pre-existing 
levels.38 
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The Kennedy Revolution
If the Shah thought he had a tough experience with the Eisenhower 
administration, the results of the November 1960 presidential elec-
tion would be altogether more foreboding. John F. Kennedy’s views 
on foreign policy were nurtured and influenced by a group of aca-
demics whom he had gathered around himself whilst Senator for 
Massachusetts between 1953 and 1960, who introduced him to the 
idea of strongly encouraging incremental democratic and econom-
ic development in developing countries as an alternative to simply 
seeking political stability.39 One of the aforementioned academics, 
Walt Rostow, who became Deputy National Security Advisor in 
Kennedy’s NSC, was instrumental in influencing Kennedy, particu-
larly for introducing him to his own interpretation of Modernisa-
tion Theory, the Rostovian Take-off Model, which outlined a proc-
ess by which non-developed countries can be modernised along 
a western example.40 Despite the aforementioned, Kennedy broadly 
subscribed to the suspicion of Soviet intentions that had charac-
terised the Eisenhower administration, and came to office in the 
context of clear Soviet dominance in the space race, and with the 
belief that they were also leading the missile race. Hence Kennedy 
held a curious blend of progressive, yet clearly traditional set of be-
liefs, a dichotomy that would be deeply tested when applied to the 
Middle East. 
The Kennedy administration translated the progressive side of 
its philosophy into action by creating the Agency for International 
Development (AID). Coming barely two months into Kennedy’s 
tenure, AID was clearly symbolic of the administrations priorities 
to move beyond the idea that aid was merely an expensive “short-
run” tool used to provide basic economic, military and political sta-
bility.41 Instead, aid would prioritise self-help and long term plan-
ning aligning America ‘with the forces for economic progress in the 
less developed countries.’42 It amalgamated the bulk of the bureau-
cratically fragmented American aid structure, and reinvigorated 
and expanded aid operations to fulfil Kennedy’s aim of initiating 
a  ‘Decade of Development.’43 Regarding the Middle East, the phi-
losophy behind AID reinforced Kennedy’s intentions, as enunciated 
on the campaign trail in 1960, when he noted that ‘the Middle East 
needs water, not war; tractors, not tanks; bread, not bombs.’44 AID 
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was a direct product of modernisation theory, particularly via its 
emphasis of using aid to initiate a transition towards market econo-
mies and democracy in developing nations.45 
The broad strategy, with AID at its heart, was to treat emerging 
nationalism with respect, and offer predominantly non-military as-
sistance to inspire pro-western social and economic development 
and thereby tentative democratisation; rather than push prospec-
tive allies out of the reach of American influence and towards total-
itarianism. Hence, barely two months into his presidency, Kennedy 
set out an approach that was at odds with Eisenhower’s conviction 
of supporting authoritarian, yet western orientated, regimes as 
a best means to ensure strategic stability. 
The Kennedy administration entered office to a chorus of alarm-
ism over Iran, which had been building through the prior year. 
A JCS report, presented on 26 January 1961, noted that Iran was ‘the 
soft spot’ in the CENTO defence alliance, chiefly due to its endur-
ing military and political weakness.46 With the former in mind, in 
early February, the administration tasked the State Department to 
prepare a summary of the situation in Iran, with special focus on its 
internal political, economic and social issues.47 The British reported 
a similar assessment to that of the JCS during a bilateral meeting of 
British Embassy officials at the State Department on 13 February. 
Lord Hood, Minister at the British Embassy, noted that the Shah’s 
survival prospects generated “a very special problem” which was of 
great concern to Britain.48 A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in 
February 1961 concurred, concluding that possibilities for sudden 
change in Iran, revolutionary in nature, were high.49 Hence, rela-
tions between the two nations started badly, and unsurprisingly 
reached a ‘nadir’ during the Kennedy administration.50 
Kennedy’s Iran revisionism caused battle lines to form between 
the reformist president, and the State Department who were domi-
nated by “traditionalists,” largely content with the status quo so-
lidified by the 1953 coup, with the autocratic Shah at the helm.51 
Although the February 1961 NIE had concluded that Iran was do-
mestically unstable, the broad thrust of the analysis was directed to-
wards pushing for deeper American support for the Shah as an em-
battled ally, rather than a recognition that a post-Shah order should 
be envisioned, as Kennedy’s personal position implied. There was 
therefore, at the outset, a divergence between the reformist White 
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House, and the vast majority of the organs of government in Wash-
ington, particularly the State Department. 
By early May 1961 the alarm had been raised further in Washing-
ton due to growing domestic instability and reports of violent street 
protests in Tehran, giving Kennedy the final push towards the form-
ing of a special Iran Task Force. The Task Force was constituted to 
provide medium-range objectives, rather than to produce a short-
term review. Arms spending cuts, military personnel cuts from 
208,000 to 150,000, and providing direct recommendations on do-
mestic politics were adopted as operational guiding principles from 
the outset,52 giving the entire exercise a clear, yet broad mandate. 
As NSC Staffer Robert Komer described the logic that informed the 
Task Force, ‘every time the Shah mentioned “more arms,” JFK’s re-
sponse would be “more reforms.”’53 Hence, the reports and recom-
mendations from the Task Force, the first of which was delivered in 
mid-May 1961, had an air of inevitability about them. 
The disposition of the Task Force prompted the Shah to concede 
“room for discussion” over his army size, yet he remained resolute 
that Iran must receive more advanced military equipment, which 
would mean increased overall expense.54 By the late summer of 
1961, despite being frequently told the “home truths” that he should 
not expect an increase in military aid, 55 the Shah continued to press 
hard on the American Embassy in Tehran to convince the State De-
partment to lobby for a “restudy” of his military needs.56 Tensions 
subsequently emerged within the NSC that Iran was slipping into 
a domestic political crisis, exacerbated by its dire financial situa-
tion. In a memorandum to Kennedy on 4 August, Komer suggested 
that the State Department was proving too passive via their recom-
mendations to further subsidise Iranian deficits. Komer added that 
the new ambassador in Tehran, Julius Holmes, who had assumed 
the position in mid June 1961, was proving ineffective in exercising 
political leverage on the Shah to take affirmative action on his do-
mestic situation.57 Kennedy concurred, and three days later directed 
the State Department to report to the Iran Task Force as part of 
a follow-on study.58
As Kennedy’s directive began to take effect, Komer noted on 
11  August in a  memorandum to National Security Adviser Mc-
George Bundy, that although Kennedy’s input had put the State De-
partment’s “feet to the fire,” ‘I ain’t happy, but I pushed things just 
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about as far as I could. The main thing is that we’ve got State mov-
ing again.’59 Komer’s concern was that the State Department had 
developed a “sense of fatalistic resignation,” which refused to coun-
tenance anything beyond the status quo represented by the Shah.60 
With that point in mind, Komer successfully impressed on the Task 
Force, the viability of looking beyond the Shah and ‘backing to the 
hilt the best alternative available,’ an assessment that, once again, 
Kennedy concurred with.61 Although Komer was quite correct to 
attribute much of Iran’s problems to the Shah, the lack of a cred-
ible alternative figure or grouping to govern Iran, as its domestic 
political scene was fragmented and characterised by mistrust, was 
fortuitous luck for the Shah.62 
By October, the crisis over Iran’s internal problems had reached 
the point where there were widespread fears across Washington 
that America was ‘inhibited in both the military and the political 
spheres’ due to potential opportunistic subversion, or even invasion 
of Iran by the Soviets.63 The concern was enough to spur the Task 
Force to recommend on 14 October a systematic rescue programme 
comprising of emergency economic aid to allow the systems of gov-
ernment merely ‘to survive.’64 More importantly, a five-year military 
aid plan for 1962–1967 at $50 million per annum was outlined (an 
approximate $12 million per annum reduction on previous levels) 
which had at its heart a reduction in overall costs in line with earlier 
plans to reduce the size of the Iranian army. 65 Fortuitously (again) 
for the Shah, although he remained convinced that the Kennedy 
administration was set on overthrowing him, it was outwardly rec-
ognised “by all members” of the Task Force that the Shah would re-
main the “centre of power” in Iran. Hence, Komer’s drive to identify 
and support an alternative was effectively dead by October 1961.66 
Despite Kennedy’s broad ambition in foreign policy to move 
away from supporting authoritarian regimes and using arms as 
a crude foreign policy tool, the overbearing needs of Cold War geo-
politics dictated the administration’s reaction to the crisis of 1961 in 
Iran. Within that logic, Iran was a double threat country, in that it 
was on the Sino-Soviet periphery and was facing existential security 
problems – to the point that it risked falling “like a ripe plum” into 
Moscow’s lap, to quote Khrushchev.67 The end result of the Task 
Force, which was effectively wound down shortly after agreeing its 
programme of action for Iran in October 1961,68 was entirely short 
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term and aimed at crisis management rather than medium term 
planning – a reversal of the very logic by which it was constituted. 
Therefore, despite all odds, as 1961 drew to a  close, the shape of 
Iran policy appeared broadly continuous in its essence to that of 
the 1950s.
1962: A Change in Fortunes
As Washington prepared to receive the Shah for a state visit in au-
tumn 1962, discussions centred around the exact composition of 
the military aid package he would be presented with. The State 
Department, with Ambassador Holmes at the forefront pushed 
for a $70 million annual amount,69 whilst the NSC (Komer in par-
ticular) was resolute that the original $50 million the Task Force 
had recommended was adequate. Komer anticipated that Kennedy 
would use the visit to talk frankly to the Shah about his unreasona-
ble demands in a way that the Embassy seemed unwilling or unable, 
via the logic that since the Iranian army could not “fight its way out 
of a paper bag,” the Shah would be forced to comply as he relied on 
American support for his own survival, both domestically and in 
lieu of the Soviet threat.70 Komer’s views, although valid in essence, 
were over simplified, and roundly underestimated the Shah’s char-
acteristic stubbornness. 
In early March, the Shah requested that his visit be moved for-
ward due to the urgency with which he wanted to discuss his mili-
tary problems. The news was accompanied with indications that 
the Shah was in a mood of depression and resentment, directly due 
to the proposed reduction in military aid, and that he was consider-
ing abdication.71 The abdication threat was likely a ruse by the Shah, 
a point which Komer implicitly pressed as he recommended that 
Kennedy approve the earlier visit with the proviso that he gave no 
indication of a revision on how much “military baksheesh” the Shah 
would get.72 He further reminded Kennedy that ‘(o)ur job is not just 
how to keep this unstable monarch from kicking over the traces but 
how to cajole him into paying more attention to what we consider 
are the key internal problems confronting Iran.’73
Komer’s position was influenced somewhat by a draft report that 
AID had delivered to the White House on 8 March for eventual 
discussion at a NSC Standing Group meeting on Iran, scheduled 
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to take place on 23 March. The paper recommended that the total 
amount of military aid over proposed the five-year plan could be 
raised by ten per cent as a minimal concession to the Shah, as a bar-
gaining tool to ensure he accepted the reduction by one quarter of 
his armed personnel. The paper went on to caution that ‘the almost 
psychotic obsession of the Shah with the problem of his military 
security is the overriding consideration in negotiating with him.’74 
With the positions of AID and Komer in mind, Kennedy ap-
proached his military representative, Maxwell D. Taylor, in mid-
March to advise over whether there was any basis to the central 
bargaining position of the Shah that military aid to Iran was 
stunted compared with its regional counterparts.75 Taylor advised 
Kennedy that although Turkey received more military aid both 
qualitatively and quantitatively, there were valid reasons for this, 
chiefly Turkey’s joint membership of NATO and CENTO (the suc-
cessor to the Baghdad Pact). Regarding Pakistan, its military aid 
programme commenced later than Iran’s, in 1954, by which time 
Iran had already received substantial investment. Hence, aid was 
at an enhanced rate as Pakistan was playing catch-up. Additionally, 
the British training provided to the Pakistani military had enabled 
it to absorb higher order equipment more effectively than the com-
paratively backward Iranian forces, explaining the higher technical 
level of the equipment directed to Pakistan.76 
With all advice to hand, Kennedy agreed to move the Shah’s vis-
it forward to either 10–17 April or 11–18 June.77 The Shah quickly 
replied on 18 March, noting that he would arrive on 10 April, the 
earliest date offered.78 Prior to the 23 March meeting of the NSC 
Standing Group meeting on Iran, Kennedy decided to defer any 
further substantive discussions over the peculiarities of the mili-
tary aid deal until the Shah’s arrival, allowing the Shah the oppor-
tunity to make his case.79 In anticipation of the Shah’s visit, several 
cabinet meetings were held in early April to address the military 
aid offer. Both Kennedy, and Ambassador Holmes who had been 
recalled to Washington, attended the meetings. During one such 
meeting on 9 April, McNamara suggested a significant reduction in 
naval equipment and softening of certain maintenance costs in the 
original proposal in order to allow the Shah four squadrons of the 
F-5A – a new low cost fighter, which had been recently adopted and 
produced for export and domestic training purposes only.80 This 
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was done in anticipation that the Shah would respond better with 
what was a prised acquisition. Due to the amendments and reduc-
tions in the aforementioned areas, the overall deal was still within 
the original limit, which had been developed by AID on 8 March, of 
$330 million.81 
After a day of preliminary meetings in Washington 11 April, the 
Shah met with Kennedy and the full cabinet the following morn-
ing. As expected the discussion revolved around military issues 
and Kennedy’s desire to see Iran’s army reduced in size, which the 
Shah rejected. The Shah analogised that Iran was being treated like 
a concubine whilst its CENTO neighbours were being treated like 
wives.82 Kennedy reassured that America had two major concerns 
regarding Iran that necessitated dedicated attention to its needs: 
military security and economic development.83 Underlining the na-
ture to which the Kennedy administration had accepted the Shah, 
Kennedy noted in a private conversation with the Shah on the same 
day, that without the Shah, Iran and the entire Middle East ‘would 
collapse.’84 Whilst it is unlikely that Kennedy’s statement was much 
more than a reassurance tactic, when viewed alongside Kennedy’s 
rapprochement with Nasser and India, and the general optimism 
that existed for the region due to Kennedy’s overarching develop-
ment philosophy, the transcript does indicate a significant warming 
in the personal rapport between Kennedy and the Shah. 
As a result of the Shah’s visit, the broad $330 million provisional 
plan was formalised, offering of a firm five-year military aid com-
mitment to Iran between 1962 and 1967, subject to Congressional 
approval, and subject to the Shah’s acceptance, which he deferred 
on to further study the offer.85 Additionally, a  military planning 
team was shaped to visit Tehran and assess the feasibility of the 
proposed personnel cuts the Iranian army, which remained a con-
dition of the deal.
As the Shah continued to mull over his military aid offer, Iran’s 
economic situation continued to sharply deteriorate through the 
spring and early summer of 1962, to the point that the State De-
partment’s Policy Planning Council upgraded its ‘Basic National 
Security Policy’ paper to emphasise the resulting “special impor-
tance” of enhanced administration focus on Iran.86 The alarm was 
enhanced by the seemingly endemic instability in Iraq following its 
1958 Coup, and its subsequent swing towards the Soviet orbit in the 
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years since, amplifying long standing concerns over Soviet military 
relationships with nations in the extended region, notably Egypt 
and India. The Shah was unphased by his economic problems, and 
continued to press for $135 million additional military aid on top of 
the (still) pending five-year deal offered in April.87 
In the early autumn, Iran and the USSR began to normalise dip-
lomatic relations, eventually resulting in a deal in mid-September, 
which guaranteed that Iran would not be used as ‘a medium of ag-
gression against the USSR.’88 Albeit under the cloak of the Shah’s 
emerging rhetoric of independent foreign policy, considering the 
on-going disagreements of military aid, and due to the fact that he 
had stalled on rapprochement with the Soviets only three years ear-
lier, the timing of this move was not a coincidence. This was the 
second time that the Shah used brinkmanship with the Soviets as 
a tool to effectively blackmail an American administration to pro-
vide him with the military equipment he desired, and it would not 
be the last time.
Upon learning of the Soviet-Iran deal on 15 September, the De-
partments of State and Defense approached the White House to 
seek possible concessions to placate the Shah – to which Komer 
urged Bundy to reply, ‘the President personally says “hell no.”’89 
After three days of deliberation, a compromise won Kennedy’s ap-
proval, which despite “severe funding limitations,” added radar 
equipment and restored the naval frigates that were originally re-
moved from the five-year programme in April to accommodate the 
F-5A squadrons.90 Furthermore, news was transmitted to the Shah 
the following day, on 19 September, that the military study group, 
which had been deliberating over force levels in Iran, had finally 
agreed that the Shah’s army be reduced to 160,000, rather than the 
earlier figure of 150,000.91 Hence, the Shah had (again) proven effec-
tive in bargaining a much-improved deal, a realisation that grated 
significantly on Komer, who stressed that Iran policy had reverted 
to becoming ‘essentially reactive,’ indistinguishable from that of 
previous administrations.92 
Into the spring of 1963, with the Iran’s domestic reform pro-
gramme (White Revolution) underway, things were looking much 
better for the Shah. Yet, Kennedy remained alert to ensuring that 
the domestic reforms were having the desired effect.93 However, 
Iran Desk Officer at the State Department, John Bowling, later 
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admitted that through this period, the State Department ‘shame-
lessly led the White House to believe that the Shah’s White Revolu-
tion was the greatest thing since cellophane.’94 A similar reflection 
came from William Polk a member of the State Department’s Policy 
Planning Committee. Polk noted that his experiences visiting Iran 
sometime later, in December 1963, had caused him to become “dis-
turbed” that Ambassador Holmes, and by association the State De-
partment, had not “mirrored adequately” the adverse effects of the 
Shah’s reform programme, to the effect that he felt that the Embas-
sy had been describing an entirely mythical state of affairs in their 
reporting through the prior twelve months.95 Partially as a result of 
the one-sided reporting, but also perhaps due to the cascade of re-
gional events that had transpired over late 1962 and 1963 with the 
war in Yemen at the forefront and the regional stand-off the con-
flict had initiated between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Kennedy even-
tually bowed to the constant pressure and regarded Iran’s domestic 
developments in a  positive light, and made a  concerted effort to 
maintain the Shah as an ally.96 The bitterest pill to swallow for the 
Kennedy idealists such as Komer, who remained resiliently opposed 
to the Shah throughout the period, was that hindsight had shown 
that through his reforms, the Shah was actually consolidating his 
autocracy, not moving towards significant social reform.
Conclusion
The developments of this early period, often overlooked, prove 
a fascinating and essential addition to the history of the US-Iranian 
relationship during the Cold War. Kennedy’s initial press for reform 
in Iran has been dismissed as a brief irritation97 in the progressively 
emerging relationship between the two nations, and something 
that would not be again revisited until the Presidency of Jimmy 
Carter (1977–1981). Although doubts remained over the intentions 
of the Shah to be a genuine reformer, by the spring of 1963, Kennedy 
had laid the groundwork with the Shah, building upon the legacy 
left behind by Eisenhower, for the consolidation of a solid Ameri-
can ally in the region, which would go on to hold major importance 
in years to come. 
The victory of the Shah in overcoming Kennedy’s ideological dis-
taste of the character of his autocratic regime cleared the way for 
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a mature arms credit relationship in which the monarch’s desire to 
modernise Iran’s armed forces and build the country into ‘the Japan 
of West Asia’98 began to take shape, albeit slowly at this point in his-
tory. It would take until late in Lyndon B. Johnson’s second term in 
1967–1968, and several further regional developments would need 
to occur – most notably the withdrawal of Britain east of Suez in 
1971 – for the Shah to begin to find fertile ground in Washington 
for his grander military plans. Those plans were finally realised in 
May 1972 during the Nixon administration as the Shah and Nixon 
signed a multi billion dollar arms deal that rendered all prior arms 
agreements between two nations in peacetime diminutive, and set 
into motion an arms relationship of an extraordinary nature that 
would endure until the final days of the Shah’s rule. 
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